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Magistrate Judge:  Keith A. Pesto 
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April 4, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed  April 6, 2011 ) 
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___________ 
 
 
 
  
PER CURIAM 
 Dante Burton appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania‟s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District 
Court‟s order and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 In 2009, Burton filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against several employees of 
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, alleging that he was retaliated against for 
filing a successful grievance.  In particular, he asserted that, after filing a grievance that 
resulted in his compensation for the loss of clothing, he was transferred to another prison 
block, which caused him to lose his job.  He also stated that the defendants‟ explanation 
for the move—that it was based on institutional security and/or operational needs—was 
pretextual.   
 The Magistrate Judge screened the complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A, which requires the court to dismiss a complaint that is frivolous or malicious, 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 
defendant who is immune from such action.  The Magistrate Judge then dismissed, with 
prejudice, the complaint after determining that Burton could not make out a prima facie 
case of retaliation.   
  Burton now appeals. 
1
  
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the 
sua sponte dismissal of a complaint is plenary.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal, a complaint need only contain “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)).  
 Here, the Magistrate Judge explained that a prisoner bringing a retaliation claim 
must allege that:  (1) the plaintiff took some action itself protected by the constitution; (2) 
the defendant took adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) there was a causal connection between the 
plaintiff‟s protected conduct and the adverse action.  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 
(3d Cir. 2003).  The Magistrate Judge determined that Burton‟s complaint failed to state a 
claim because “a transfer from one area of a prison to another, which is the only 
constitutionally significant adverse action alleged by plaintiff, is as a matter of law 
insufficient to deter any person from pursuing his constitutional rights.” 
 The Magistrate Judge‟s decision is problematic.  First, the constitutionally 
protected act at issue is Burton‟s filing of the grievance (not the transfer to a different cell 
block), and a retaliation claim is not foreclosed even though the particular privilege that 
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 Because Burton consented to the Magistrate Judge‟s adjudication of his 
complaint, he is entitled to appeal directly to this Court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).  
 has been taken away does not implicate a constitutional right.  See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 
F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2000); Allah, 229 F.3d at 224-25.  Second, although a transfer to a 
different cell block may not be an adverse action “sufficient to deter” an ordinary person 
from filing a grievance, the Magistrate Judge failed to acknowledge that the transfer 
resulted in the loss of Burton‟s prison job, which may constitute a sufficiently serious 
adverse action.   
 Because the Magistrate Judge‟s decision misconstrues Burton‟s allegations as to 
the first two prongs of the pleading requirements for a retaliation claim, we will vacate 
the decision.  Moreover, we note that district courts must generally permit amendment of 
a complaint that is vulnerable to dismissal where a responsive pleading has not yet been 
filed, even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend.  See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. 
Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that in civil 
rights cases, “leave to amend must be granted sua sponte before dismissing” the 
complaint); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that dismissal 
without leave to amend is justified only on grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, 
or futility).   
 Accordingly, we will vacate the February 5, 2010 decision and remand the matter 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
